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*Technical Specification*

## **Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Lawful interception requirements (3GPP TS 33.106 version 8.1.0 Release 8)**

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The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under <http://webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp>.

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## Foreword

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## Introduction

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP TSG SA to allow for the standardisation in the area of lawful interception of telecommunications. This document describes in general the requirements for lawful interception.

Laws of individual nations and regional institutions (e.g. European Union), and sometimes licensing and operating conditions define a need to intercept telecommunications traffic and related information in modern telecommunications systems. It has to be noted that lawful interception shall always be done in accordance with the applicable national or regional laws and technical regulations.

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# 1 Scope

The present document provides basic interception requirements within a Third Generation Mobile Communication System (3GMS) based on ETSI TS 101 331 [2] and other national regulatory requirements and GSM specifications GSM TS 01.33 [5], GSM TS 02.33 [6] and GSM TS 03.33 [7].

The specification describes the service requirements from a Law Enforcement point of view only. The aim of this document is to define a 3GMS interception system that supports a number of regional interception regulations, but these regulations are not repeated here as they vary. Regional interception requirements shall rely on this specification to derive such information as they require.

These interception requirements shall be used to derive specific network requirements.

For details see:

- Stage 2: 3GPP TS 33.107 [9];
- Stage 3: 3GPP TS 33.108 [10].

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# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies.

- [1] European Union Council Resolution on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (17. January 1995)
- [2] ETSI TS 101 331: "Telecommunications security; Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies".
- [3] ETSI ES 201 158: "Lawful Interception; Requirements for network functions".
- [4] ETSI ES 201 671: "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic".
- [5] GSM 01.33: "Lawful Interception requirements for GSM".
- [6] GSM 02.33: "Lawful Interception - stage 1".
- [7] GSM 03.33: "Lawful Interception - stage 2".
- [8] J-STD-025-A: "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance".
- [9] 3GPP TS 33.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Lawful interception architecture and functions".
- [10] 3GPP TS 33.108: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception".

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## 3 Definitions and abbreviations

### 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply.

**Interception Area:** is a subset of the Public Lands Mobile Network (PLMN) service area comprised of a set of cells which define a geographical zone.

**Location Dependent Interception:** is interception within a PLMN service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA).

**Network Based Interception:** Interception that is invoked at a network access point regardless of Target Identity.

**Subject Based Interception:** Interception that is invoked using a specific Target Identity

**Target Identity:** A technical identity that uniquely identifies a target of interception. One target may have one or several identities.

### 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

CC	Content of Communication
IA	Interception Area
IP	Internet Protocol
IRI	Intercept Related Information
LDI	Location Dependent Interception
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LEMF	Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility
3GMS	Third Generation Mobile Communications System
VHE	Virtual Home Environment

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## 4 Relationship to Regional Requirements

Interception requirements are subject to national law and international treaties and should be interpreted in accordance with applicable national policies.

Requirements universally called out in regional interception regulatory requirements are supported by the system defined in this document. Requirements unique to a specific region are not addressed (some examples are given in Section 2 as references).

The intercept system defined here provides subject based interception. Network based interception is not included.

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## 5 Requirements

### 5.1 Description of requirements

This section gives the general description of lawful interception requirements.

### 5.1.1 General technical requirements

Figure 1 shows the general system for interception. Technical interception is implemented within a 3GMS by special functionality on network elements shown in the figure.




Figure 1: General specification for interception

### 5.1.2 General principles

3GMS shall provide access to the intercepted Content of Communications (CC) and the Intercept Related Information (IRI) of the mobile target and services related to the target (e.g. Call Forwarding) on behalf of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs).

A mobile target in a given 3GMS can be a subscriber of that 3GMS, or a user roaming from another 3GMS or from any other network capable of using that 3GMS (such as a GSM or mobile satellite). The intercepted CC and the IRI can only be delivered for activities on that given 3GMS.

For interception, there needs to be a means of identifying the target, correspondent and initiator of the communication. Target Identities used for interception of CS and GPRS service shall be MSISDN, IMEI and IMSI. Target Identities for multi-media shall be SIP URL. Other target identities for multi-media are for further study. When encryption is provided and managed by the network, it shall be a national option as to whether the network provides the CC to the LEA decrypted, or encrypted with keys and additional information to make decryption possible. Encryption not provided or managed by the network, e.g. user provided end-to-end encryption, cannot be removed by the network. In the case that the NWOs/ APs/SvPs provides encryption keys to the subscriber or customer but does not provide the encryption itself, the NWOs/ APs/SvPs shall provide the keys to the LEA if required by national regulations.

Location Dependent Interception, (LDI) allows a 3GMS to service multiple interception jurisdictions within its service area. Multiple law agencies with their own interception areas can be served by the 3GMS. All the information or rules given for interception within a 3GMS apply to interception within an IA when Location Dependent Interception is invoked. A target may be marked in one or more different IAs within the same 3GMS. Interception is not required nor prohibited by this standard when Location Dependent Interception is active and the location of the target subscriber is not known or available.



### 5.1.3 Applicability to telecommunication services

The requirement for lawful interception is that all telecommunications services for the 3GMS standards should be capable of meeting the requirements within this document.

### 5.1.4 Interception within the Home and Visited Network

The introduction of the Virtual Home Environment, VHE, means that significant portions of subscriber services can be executed in the home or visited network, regardless of where the target is physically located.

The visited network shall intercept only those UMTS services that the visited network provides to the target subscriber. Furthermore, the visited network shall not be required to intercept services executed by the home network.

Based upon national regulations, UMTS services executed in the home network may be intercepted in the home network.

## 5.2 Normal operation

This section gives the expected operation for lawful interception.

### 5.2.1 Intercept administration requirements

A secure means of administrating the service by the 3GMS operator and intercept requesting entity is necessary. This mechanism shall provide means to activate, deactivate, show, or list targets in the 3GMS as quickly as possible. The function shall be policed by appropriate authentication and audit procedures. The administration function shall allow specific IAs to be associated with target subscribers when Location Dependent Interception is being used.

#### 5.2.1.1 Activation of LI

As a result of the activation (of a warrant) it shall be possible to request for the specified target, either IRI, or both the IRI and the CC and designate the LEA destination addresses for the delivery of the IRI and if required CC. These shall be selectable on a 3GMS basis according to national options.

#### 5.2.1.2 Deactivation of LI

As a result of deactivation it shall be possible to stop all, or a part of, interception activities for the specified target.

#### 5.2.1.3 Security of processes

The intercept function shall only be accessible by authorised personnel.

To be effective, interception must take place without the knowledge of either party to the communication. Therefore, decryption must also take place without either party being aware that it is happening.

No indication shall be given to any person except authorised personnel that the intercept function has been activated on a target. Authentication, encryption, audits, log files and other mechanisms may be used to maintain security in the system. Audit procedures should be capable of keeping accurate logs of administration commands.

NWOs/APs/SvPs shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to intercept related information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects:

(A) the privacy and security of communications and intercept related information not authorized to be intercepted;  
and

(B) information regarding the LEA's interception of communications and access to intercept related information.

## 5.2.2 Intercept invocation

### 5.2.2.1 Invocation events for lawful interception

In general, Lawful interception should be invoked when the transmission of information or an event takes place that involves the target. Examples of when Lawful interception could be invoked are when:

- A circuit switched call is requested originated from, terminated to, or redirected by the target,
- Location information related to the target facility is modified by the subscriber attaching or detaching from the network, or if there is a change in location,
- An SMS transfer is requested - either originated from or terminated to the target,
- A data packet is transmitted to or from a target,
- A Conference Call is targeted.

### 5.2.2.2 Invocation and removal of interception regarding services

The invocation of lawful interception shall not alter the operation of a target's services or provide indication to any party involved in communication with the target. Lawful interception shall not alter the standard function of 3GMS network elements.

If lawful interception is activated during a circuit switched service, the currently active circuit switched service is not required to be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a circuit switched service, all ongoing intercepted activities may continue until they are completed.

If lawful interception is activated when a packet data service is already in use, the next packets transmitted shall be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a packet data service, the next packets shall not be transmitted.

### 5.2.2.3 Correlation of information and product

When both IRI and CC are invoked, an unambiguous correlation shall be established between associated IRI, IRI and CC, and associated CC within the single domain (for example different legs in CS or different packets in PS). The IRI and CC shall be delivered in as near real time as possible.

NOTE: Clarification about correlation limitations during inter-PLMN call or session handovers is for further study.

## 5.3 Exceptional procedures

When a failure occurs while establishing the connection towards the LEA to transfer the CC this shall not result in any interruption of the ongoing telecommunications service. No further specific requirements apply for the CC in the 3GMS.

A national option may be that when failure occurs while trying to provide the IRI it shall be temporarily stored in the 3GMS and some further attempts shall be made to deliver it if available.

## 5.4 Interworking considerations

For 3GMS, the network, homed or visited, shall not be responsible to interpret the protocol used by the target, or to remove user level compression or encryption.

## 5.5 Charging aspects

The 3GMS may charge for intercept service subject to national laws and regulations. Charging mechanisms include the following:

- Use of network resources,
- Activation and deactivation of the target,
- Every intercept invocation,
- Flat rate.

The 3GMS shall be capable of producing intercept-charging data. It shall be possible to produce this data in such a way that access by non-authorised personnel or the target is precluded.

## 5.6 Minimum service requirements

Quality of service, capacity, integrity and reliability are the subject of bilateral agreement between the relevant authorities and the 3GMS operator. The QoS towards the delivery function provided by the network must be at least that the network provides to the target.

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# 6 Handover Interface Requirements

Handover interface requirements are defined in 3GPP TS 33.108 [10]. For national or regional specifications, see ETSI ES 201 671 [4] and J-STD-025-A [8].

## Annex A (informative): Change history

Change history					
TSG SA #	Version	CR	Tdoc SA	New Version	Subject/Comment
SA#04	1.0.0			3.0.0	Approved at SA#4 and placed under TSG SA Change Control
SA#06	3.0.0	0001		3.1.0	
SP-11	3.1.0	0002	SP-010135	4.0.0	Update of TS 33.106 for Release 4
SP-11	3.1.0	0003	SP-010136	5.0.0	Release 5 updates
SP-17	5.0.0	0004	SP-020510	5.1.0	Changes to 33.106 to clarify interception capabilities
SP-22	5.1.0	0006	SP-030589	6.0.0	Correction to lawful interception references (Rel-6)
SP-24	6.0.0	0007	SP-040396	6.1.0	Clarification on delivery of IRI and CC
SP-29	6.1.0	0008	SP-050569	7.0.0	Correlation for IMS interception
	7.0.0			7.0.1	2006-01: Editorial to show correct version on cover
SP-38	7.0.1	0009	SP-070788	8.0.0	Clarification of requirements
SP-39	8.0.0	0010	SP-080171	8.1.0	Alignment of CC encryption statement in ETSI TS 101 671

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# History

<b>Document history</b>		
V8.1.0	October 2008	Publication