SIM-Max Tech's Super-SIM

[Mad]

 On Tue, 8 Mar 2011 16:31:47 +0100, Alfonso De Gregorio wrote:
>> Actually comp128-2 has a 54bit Kc it seems.
>
> Have you observed a COMP128-2 implementation returning a 54bit long
> Kc?, or have you heard about this from somebody else?
> Can you please disclose more about the SIM model and the operator
> running this A3/A8 implementation?

 Interesting question, how do we know if it's comp128-2 what is being
 used by a specific operator?
 They can use whatever algo they want - or their equipment vendor 
 provides
 - in their sims and auth infrastructure producing deliberately weakened
 Kcs.

>
> One more weakened key derivation function (after the first version)
> would be interesting per se. Still, it would be even more interesting
> to give a closer look at this obscure cipher we carry in our
> pockets...
>

 No question, there still are given out sims weakening the anyway broken
 a5/1.
 Interestingly I observed that operators have mixed occurrence of weak 
 for
 one and non-weak Kcs for another sim.
 Another possibility is that they are able to determine that for all 
 sims
 by choice of the RAND the network sends. So some people, contract-wise,
 phone-wise or regions could be easier tapped than others.
 But it's just speculation...

 The most promising approach after (really) good cryptologists looking 
 at
 in- and output is to open up and grinding down a sim chip and taking
 pictures to reconstruct its logic, as it has been done with mifare etc.
 Aren't there people reading this who are experienced in the latter?

 Regards,
   Mad